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The American Constitution as “Our Law” 
Jack M. Balkin* 
A central theme of Living Originalism is that the legitimacy of the 
American Constitution depends on its success not only as basic law and 
higher law but also as our law. To succeed, the Constitution must provide 
a viable framework for governance that allocates powers and 
responsibilities (basic law), and it must serve as a source of aspiration, a 
reflection of values that stand above our ordinary legal practices and hold 
them to account (higher law). But it must also succeed as our law—a 
constitution that Americans view ―as our achievement and the product of 
our efforts as a people, which involves a collective identification with 
those who came before us and with those who will come after us.‖1 
Viewing the Constitution as our law means that we are attached to it, even 
if we never officially consented to it. We regard it as belonging to us, and 
therefore we have the right to interpret it for ourselves and make claims in 
its name.2 
The notion that the Constitution‘s legitimacy might depend on its 
success as ―our law‖ is a useful frame for discussing the excellent papers 
in this symposium. I will not be able to address everything the contributors 
have to say; instead I shall pick a few ideas in each essay, and show how 
they are connected to the idea of the American Constitution as ―our law.‖ 
I. ―OUR LAW‖ AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
One of the most exciting things about the symposium was the chance to 
hear how two distinguished comparative constitutionalists—Kim 
Scheppele and Sujit Choudhry—would engage with the arguments of the 
book.3 Living Originalism, like its companion volume, Constitutional 
Redemption, is primarily a book about the American Constitution and 
 
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. My thanks to 
Sanford Levinson for his comments on a previous draft. 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 60 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; 
see also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
239 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]. 
2. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 60. 
3. Sujit Choudhry, “Our Law” and Comparative Constitutional Law, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 
(2013); Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin Is an American, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 23 (2013). 
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American constitutional culture. That is not to say that I did not think 
about comparisons with other countries when I wrote it. Comparative 
considerations influenced, for example, the central idea of Constitutional 
Redemption that behind constitutional interpretations are stories, that 
different constitutional cultures may have very different stories, and that 
people understand their constitution in terms of an explicit or implicit 
narrative about the constitution‘s role in the development of their society.4 
Comparative ideas also influenced Living Originalism‘s argument that 
constitutions around the world feature a distribution of rules, standards, 
principles, and silences, and that this distribution is not accidental but tells 
us something important about the point of a constitution, namely, that 
constitutions are not simply devices for preventing change. Constitutions 
are frameworks for a sustainable politics that channel change rather than 
merely forestall it.5 
Even so, I wrote the book as an account of American constitutional law 
and the American constitutional tradition. I was concerned that what I said 
about the United States—its national narratives, its revolutionary tradition, 
its ancient and very difficult to amend constitution, its veneration of the 
Constitution and of the generation that framed it—would not apply equally 
well to other countries‘ experiences.6 Jeffrey Goldsworthy reminded me 
that the triptych of ―basic law, higher law, our law‖ that I developed in 
Living Originalism might sound strange in New Zealand or Australia, 
countries in which the constitution is surely basic law but not necessarily 
higher (that is, aspirational) law.7 He also noted that a significant part of 
Canada‘s basic law, the British North America Act, was not the creation of 
We the Canadian People but of Canada‘s colonial overseer, the British 
Parliament. Therefore, it cannot be ―our law‖ for Canadians in the same 
way that the U.S. Constitution is ―our law‖ for Americans.8 
Making broad generalizations about constitutions and constitutional 
theory drawn primarily from the American experience is likely to get you 
dismissed as yet another parochial American. On the other hand, being 
overly modest about what your theory says about other constitutions and 
other countries is likely to draw the same criticism! 
 
4. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 3-4, 25-32, 50-60. 
5. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 24-25, 29-30 (proposing that the purpose of 
constitutions with combinations of rules, standards, principles and silences is to channel and discipline 
future constitutional judgment rather than forestall it); id. at 28-29 (noting prevalence of open-ended 
and abstract rights guarantees in post-World War II constitutions); Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives 
on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 838-41 (arguing that the fact that constitutional 
cultures around the world do not employ original methods originalism offers good reasons to believe 
that original methods originalism is not required by fidelity to a written constitution). 
6. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 81-82, 90-91, 359 n.2. 
7. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles, 2012 
U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 684-90, 694, 709 (arguing that many constitutions do not serve as ―higher law‖ or 
as ―our law‖). 
8. Id. at 694. 
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Choudhry correctly points out that constitutional comparativism is 
simply unavoidable if one wants to apply the arguments of Living 
Originalism and Constitutional Redemption to other countries. The two 
books argue that, in order to be successful, a constitution like America‘s 
must simultaneously succeed as basic law, as higher law, and as our law.9 
But countries around the world have a wide variety of different political 
histories, and constitutions may not play the same central and constitutive 
role in their national narratives as the American Constitution does in the 
United States. How, then can we translate the ideas of the two books to the 
political experience of other countries? 
There is a further complication. In the United States, the question of 
comparative constitutionalism is unfortunately tied to an acrimonious 
debate over whether it is legitimate for judges to cite, make use of, or even 
expose themselves to comparative constitutional materials. Choudhry has 
called this debate ―deadlocked, futile, and sterile.‖10 I couldn‘t agree more, 
and that is one reason why I didn‘t have much to say about it in my two 
books. In this symposium, however the question of comparativism—and 
the use of comparative materials—is squarely presented. 
I argue that the Constitution is ―our law‖ when we are attached to it, 
identify with it, and see it as belonging to us and as the product of our 
collective efforts. Does the fact that the Constitution is ―our law‖ mean 
that we cannot use materials from other countries? Would doing so make 
the Constitution less our law? Choudhry points out that India‘s 
constitution has much in common with America‘s. In ―the world‘s other 
great common law, federal, post-colonial liberal democracy,‖ he explains, 
citizens are attached to the Indian Constitution, view it as belonging to 
them, identify the constitution with the nation, and repeatedly call upon 
the memory of the constitution‘s founding.11 And yet Indian constitutional 
law, Choudhry explains, has no qualms about using comparative materials. 
In India, ―something akin to living originalism is married to deep 
comparative constitutional reasoning.‖12 
Surely Choudhry is correct. There is no a priori reason why a 
constitution that is ―our law‖ could not engage deeply with comparative 
materials.13 What matters is the nature of the constitutional culture at 
 
9. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 59, 66. 
10. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 6. 
11. Id. at 3. 
12. Id. 
13. Vicki Jackson, for example, has argued for a philosophy of ―judicial engagement.‖ VICKI C. 
JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010). Engagement 
emphasizes a ―commitment[] to judicial deliberation and is open to the possibilities of either harmony 
or dissonance between national self-understanding and transnational norms.‖ Id. at 71. The point of 
engagement, Jackson explains, is to encourage judges to think more carefully ―about the content of 
their own constitutional norms‖ by comparing and contrasting them with international and 
transnational norms. Id. Engagement is as interested in how other countries are different as in how 
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issue. The central questions are and must be: who are ―we,‖ and how do 
we come to understand who ―we‖ are? A constitutional culture might 
decide who ―we‖ are solely through an examination of its history, 
attempting to disregard the influence of every other nation. But this is a 
hopeless task, and, in any case, it is not true of the American experience. 
Americans explain their constitutional traditions in terms of other 
countries in the past: ancient Judea, Greece, and Rome as well as 
eighteenth-century Britain. We understand that these legal cultures are not 
foreign to our law because we see them as part of us. Put another way, we 
constitute our tradition as Americans so that it includes them as honored 
predecessors. The constitution of this tradition is simultaneously a 
constitution of ancestors and strangers, those with whom we identify and 
disidentify, heroes and villains, good examples and bad, ―us‖ and ―them.‖ 
In Constitutional Redemption, I point out that constitutional interpretation 
is often based on narratives, and these narratives often involve selective 
identification with the past and people who lived in the past.14 The same is 
true, more generally, with the construction of constitutional traditions. 
Members of a constitutional culture identify some parts of world history as 
―of us‖ and others as ―not us.‖ Our nationalism is actually a selective 
comparativism. So too is India‘s; it simply chooses different tools for 
comparison. 
One way to understand who we are is through comparison and contrast 
with others. We see ourselves reflected in the traditions of other countries, 
or we understand ourselves in contrast to what is done elsewhere. For 
example, originalists often explain the American Constitution both in 
terms of its similarities to and its differences from the constitutional 
monarchy of Great Britain.15 During World War II and the Cold War, 
Americans sometimes argued about the proper interpretation of American 
civil rights and civil liberties by contrasting the American political 
tradition with that of fascist Germany and the Communist Soviet Union 
and its satellites.16 
Even the choice of which countries and examples to learn from says 
something about who we are. The choice of the British Empire rather than 
the French Republic, of ancient Israel rather than ancient China, is an 
implicit construction of identity. As America‘s demographics and 
 
they are similar. Accordingly, engagement does not necessarily require dialogue between the 
constitutional court and other courts; its focus is not reciprocity but self-understanding. Id. 
14. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 3, 50-60 (arguing that constitutional 
legitimacy is premised on an understanding of the present through ―an interpretation of and selective 
identification with the past‖). 
15. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 177-88 (2005) 
(contrasting the powers of the American President with the English monarch); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
69 (Alexander Hamilton) (offering a similar comparison). 
16. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS i, 67-71 (1999) (discussing the 
impact of Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism on American conceptions of rights). 
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experiences change, so too will Americans‘ views of their history and 
origins. This, in turn, may lead them to imagine their constitutional 
traditions differently. For example, by the middle of the twentieth century, 
due in part to decades of Jewish immigration and a war against Nazi 
Germany, it became commonplace to speak of America not as a Christian 
nation but as founded on a ―Judeo-Christian tradition.‖17 Seemingly fixed 
traditions are continually re-imagined and reconstituted so that people can 
make sense of the world in which they live. Given current demographic 
trends, it would not be at all surprising if sometime in the twenty-first 
century a judge or politician spoke unselfconsciously of America‘s 
―Judeo-Christian-Islamic-Confucian‖ tradition. The fact that India defines 
itself in conversation with and in contrast to other countries is not 
inconsistent with the preservation of India‘s distinctive national or 
constitutional identity. Rather, it is a feature of that identity. 
Thus, Choudhry argues, it is perfectly plausible to have a 
―comparatively inflected living originalism that . . . affirms a distinct 
constitutional identity‖18 through the logic of similarity and difference; 
constitutional interpretation achieves this both by calling attention to 
constitutional and experiential differences and by noting ―shared 
constitutional premises,‖ experiences, and assumptions.19 Emphasizing 
difference obviously can assist in the self-understanding of a national 
constitutional project, but so can discovering commonalities. Just as 
individuals sometimes understand themselves better when they discover 
that they are not alone, and that others have gone through similar 
experiences, so too constitutional cultures can understand themselves 
better by noting how other countries have tackled similar problems and 
how similar structural and political arrangements have produced similar 
advantages and difficulties. 
―[A] claim to constitutional distinctiveness,‖ Choudhry explains, ―is 
inherently relative; a constitutional text and its interpretation are only 
unique by comparison with other constitutions and interpretations.‖20 
―Since difference is defined in comparative terms, a keener awareness and 
a better understanding of difference can be achieved through a process of 
comparison.‖21 Moreover, ―[i]f we engage comparatively and ask why a 
foreign constitution has been drafted, and interpreted in a certain way, this 
better enables us to ask ourselves why we reason the way we do. 
 
17. See DEBORAH DASH MOORE, G.I. JEWS: HOW WORLD WAR II CHANGED A GENERATION 10 
(2004) (arguing that America‘s entry into World War II legitimated Judaism as one of the three 
―fighting faiths of democracy‖ along with Protestantism and Catholicism, leading to widespread 
acceptance of a ―Judeo-Christian‖ tradition). 
18. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 3. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 7. 
21. Id. 
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Comparative materials are interpretive foils, tools for constitutional self-
reflection that help to identify what is special or distinctive about a 
constitutional order.‖22 
Choudhry‘s arguments make particular sense to me as a constitutional 
historicist, for historicism is also a kind of comparativism. Historicists 
understand the comparative logic of similarity and difference with respect 
to time instead of (or in addition to) space. Thus, there is an obvious 
analogy between Choudhry‘s arguments about horizontal 
comparativism—between situations separated by space—and vertical 
comparativism—between situations separated by time. Sometimes we best 
understand our present situation through understanding how different the 
past was, and sometimes we are enlightened through noting historical 
patterns and similarities. Moreover, the logic of similarity and difference 
is often hybrid. To recognize the most valuable similarities we must first 
take differences into account, and to understand the most interesting 
differences we must often look past surface similarities. 
What is at stake in debates over constitutional comparativism is more 
than the potential value of recognizing similarities and differences. It is a 
debate within American constitutional culture over how that culture will 
be constituted and understood. 
The rejection of some foreign constitutional law (as opposed to foreign 
law treated as part of our traditions) is based on a construction of most of 
the rest of the world as other or as ―not us.‖ But this is only a rhetorical 
construction or a cultural convention, premised on a currently existing 
form of self-understanding and self-definition, and it could change over 
time. Indeed, that is the point of opposing the use of foreign sources in 
American constitutional argument. The fear is that the introduction of 
these sources would do more than influence American law through a 
cosmopolitan dialogue with other nations; the fear is that it would change 
our traditions and our self-conception. 
It is no secret that conservative political discourse in the United States 
has been deeply fearful of becoming more like ―Europe,‖ which serves as 
a symbol for social democratic tendencies in American policy that 
conservatives do not like. When conservatives argue against using foreign 
legal materials, I suspect that they are particularly objecting to the use of 
constitutional materials from social democratic nations—especially those 
in Europe. They fear that lawyers and judges will selectively invoke 
decisions from these nations in order to promote the progress of social 
democracy in the United States. Their concern is that repeated use of 
foreign constitutional law would infect American constitutional culture 
with these alien elements, thus changing Americans‘ self-conception and 
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an aspect of the ―culture wars‖ in that it is a struggle over the elements of 
American legal culture, reflecting a deeper struggle over American 
political culture. Arguments about the use of foreign materials in 
constitutional law are examples of what Philip Bobbitt has called 
arguments about American constitutional ethos.23 
Opponents argue that lawyers and judges using foreign sources will 
cherry-pick, using constitutional ideas they like while disregarding those 
that they find inhospitable or embarrassing.24 But that claim is less a 
criticism than a restatement of the central issue. Of course lawyers and 
judges will be selective in drawing comparisons with the experience of 
other countries; that selectiveness will be driven by the constitutional 
values they want to emphasize within the United States. The selection of 
constitutional sources is a way of struggling over what is or what should 
be American. 
The debate over the uses of foreign materials in constitutional argument, 
therefore, is more than a debate about baleful foreign influences, on the 
one hand, or potentially useful new ideas, on the other. It is a debate about 
Americanness itself. These arguments about the American constitutional 
tradition are both a description and a prescription. They do not simply 
seek to capture existing truths—they are trying to make things true (or 
more true) in practice. Nor is one side defending ―true‖ Americanness 
while the other is attempting to undermine it. Both advocates of the use of 
foreign materials and their opponents are trying to shape American 
constitutional culture. They are simply trying to move it in different 
directions. Both seek to change inchoate or unsettled understandings about 
what rhetorical performances are permissible and effective. 
The Supreme Court becomes a site of struggle because of the Court‘s 
central role in American constitutional culture, and because lawyers look 
to Supreme Court opinions as examples of legitimate argument. In this 
respect, the fight over foreign materials has much in common with Justice 
Scalia‘s crusade to banish all discussion of legislative history from 
 
23. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 94 (1978) 
(describing arguments from constitutional ethos as arguments ―whose force relies on a characterization 
of American institutions and the role within them of the American people‖). 
 Political conservatives are not the only skeptics of comparative constitutionalism. Jed Rubenfeld‘s 
critique—from a liberal perspective—of using foreign sources in American constitutional law is also 
an argument from national ethos. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1971 (2004). Rubenfeld argues that American constitutionalism, which views a constitution as a 
reflection of a sovereign people‘s commitments over time expressed through democratic lawmaking, is 
importantly different from ―European constitutional developments since the Second World War,‖ 
which view constitutions as ―express[ing] universal rights and principles, which in theory transcend 
national boundaries, applying to all societies alike.‖ Id. at 1975. 
24. See, e.g., Judicial Reliance on Foreign Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Andrew M. 
Grossman, Visiting Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation) (―What Justice Scalia has said about the 
citations of legislative history applies equally here. The trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and 
pick out your friends.‖). 
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Supreme Court opinions. Despite Scalia‘s determined efforts, legislative 
history survives because people continue to find it useful in persuading 
others; but they find it useful in part because they notice that federal and 
state courts keep using arguments from legislative history. 
Similarly, the test of whether foreign materials will become part of 
American constitutional discourse is whether judges and lawyers find 
these materials rhetorically useful. And whether they are rhetorically 
useful is not limited to the question of whether they will have persuasive 
impact in any particular case. Even if they have only limited persuasive 
impact, even if they are just window dressing for conclusions arrived at 
through other means, their presence affects constitutional culture because 
it affects the background rules of reasonable debate. That is why there is a 
fight over the inclusion of these materials. Opponents do not want 
American culture to become a culture in which lawyers or judges might 
find these materials rhetorically effective, even if they do not actually 
determine the outcome of any particular decision. 
Choudhry is far more sanguine about these possibilities. He argues that 
lawyers can and should use comparative materials not to impose unwanted 
foreign ideas but to highlight distinctive national values. His first example 
is a negative precedent or a negative comparison. The adopters of India‘s 
constitution wrote and interpreted Article 21—the equivalent of America‘s 
due process clause—in order to forestall Lochner-style interpretations.25 
India‘s framers looked to American constitutional history to forge a path 
different from America‘s. As noted above, there are many examples of 
this sort of negative comparison in American constitutional culture—for 
example, contrasting the American President to the British monarch, or 
American civil liberties to fascism or communism. Americans have little 
problem in using the comparative logic of difference to establish 
Americanness. The more interesting question is how Americans might 
employ the comparative logic of similarity. 
This is the point of Choudhry‘s second example. It involves the Indian 
Supreme Court‘s decision to protect homosexuals from discrimination 
through interpretation of Article 21 and Article 14 (the equality clause) of 
the Indian Constitution. The Indian Supreme Court invoked the views of 
other countries about sexual orientation discrimination, but Choudhry 
argues that the court‘s most important technique was not direct citation of 
these views. Instead of directly adopting the decisions of other countries as 
persuasive authority, the Court turned to a discussion of the ideals 
underlying the Indian Constitution—in particular, the ideal of 
―inclusiveness.‖26 Choudhry believes that this move allowed the Court to 
make an implicit analogy between the views of other constitutional courts 
 
25. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 9-12. 
26. Id. at 14-15. 
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and India‘s own constitutional guarantees with respect to the treatment of 
untouchables. That is, Choudhry argues that courts can use comparative 
materials to reflect on and highlight their own deep national commitments. 
Choudhry believes that American courts could use comparative 
constitutional jurisprudence in the same way—to make analogical 
arguments that would shed light on American constitutional values and the 
American constitutional tradition: ―Analogies from foreign constitutional 
systems can . . . help identify principles that Americans have already 
committed themselves to. . . . [F]oreign analogies can also be more 
disruptive, because they can highlight how precedents are unfaithful to 
national constitutional premises, and can provide the interpretive resources 
to overturn them.‖27 
Using the example of Lawrence v. Texas, he argues that Justice 
O‘Connor‘s concurring opinion, ―in applying the anti-caste doctrine . . . 
could have engaged with the reasoning of the South African Court, and 
made a parallel line of argument‖ focusing on how criminalization of 
sodomy makes homosexuals outlaws and creates a status offence.28 
O‘Connor could also have ―draw[n] an analogy between discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and race—a possibility that was highlighted 
by comparative jurisprudence from South Africa.‖29 
In fact, the argument that anti-sodomy laws make homosexuals outlaws 
and impose a status offense was made to the Court in Lawrence.30 And a 
 
27. Id. at 19. 
28. Id. at 22. 
29. Id. 
30. See Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152347 (―[T]he primary function of 
sodomy laws today is to brand gay people as ‗criminals,‘ a brand that itself works to inflict a variety of 
psychological and legal harms.‖); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 13, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164108 (―Criminal sodomy laws 
are also viewed by some members of society, including some participants in the legal system, as a 
justification for setting gay men and lesbians apart as second-class citizens not entitled to the same 
government protections as other members of society.‖); Brief of Professors of History as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at  3, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152350 
(―Sodomy laws that exclusively targeted same-sex couples . . . reflect [a] historically unprecedented 
concern to classify and penalize homosexuals as a subordinate class of citizens‖ while ―state practices 
and ideological messages worked together to create or reinforce the belief that gay persons were an 
inferior class to be shunned by other Americans.‖); Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 20, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558  (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152342 (―The 
presumptive criminal activities of gay people have civil consequences . . . . Texas and nearby states 
have invoked the outlaw status of gay people to exclude them from hate crime and employment anti-
discrimination laws; to discriminate against them in hiring and promotion decisions for state or local 
employment; to deny them custody of or even visitation with their own biological children; and to 
introduce antigay messages in sex or AIDS education programs.‖) (citations omitted); Brief of 
Constitutional Law Professors Bruce A. Ackerman et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 136139 (arguing that sodomy laws have multiple 
collateral consequences that burden intimate relationships, parental relationships, employment 
opportunities, and privacy in the home by gays and lesbians and that Texas‘s ―law can and is used as 
an excuse to persecute gay people, even if it is seldom directly enforced‖); Brief of the National 
Lesbian and Gay Law Association et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-20, Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152348 (arguing that gays are subject to ―widespread prejudice, 
9
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version of the idea does appear in Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion. As 
Justice Kennedy explained, ―Texas‘ sodomy law brands all homosexuals 
as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be 
treated in the same manner as everyone else. Indeed, Texas itself has 
previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, stipulating in a 
prior challenge to this action that the law ‗legally sanctions discrimination 
against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,‘ 
including in the areas of ‗employment, family issues, and housing.‘‖31 
Choudhry‘s point, however, is that Kennedy‘s arguments could have 
been made stronger and more convincing by using comparative 
constitutional jurisprudence, which would have helped draw attention to 
deep features of the American constitutional tradition. It would have 
emphasized that such laws reflect more than mere animus against 
homosexuals, and would have ―address[ed] the broader system of social 
meanings and subordination of which the challenged law was a part.‖32 
Phrased this way, Choudhry‘s argument could be either an argument 
that comparative analogies offer greater insight or an argument that 
comparative analogies offer greater rhetorical effectiveness. 
As to whether comparative argument leads to greater insight about 
national commitments, I agree with Choudhry‘s basic point but am not 
sure that Lawrence provides the best example to demonstrate it. The gay 
rights movement in the United States was quite familiar with the outlaws 
argument, and the argument that sodomy laws have pervasive and 
systematic subordinating effects on the lives of homosexuals.33 These 
arguments were offered to the Supreme Court in Lawrence itself.34 
Choudhry does not fully explain what extra insight analogies to South 
African jurisprudence would have provided in this particular case.35 Even 
 
ranging from everyday social interactions, to the ability to get and keep a job, obtain housing, maintain 
custody of one‘s children, walk on the street in safety, or—as demonstrated here—be free from 
arrest‖). 
31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581-82; see also id. at 581 (―[P]etitioners‘ convictions, if upheld, 
would disqualify them from or restrict their ability to engage in a variety of professions, including 
medicine, athletic training, and interior design. . . . Indeed, were petitioners to move to one of four 
States, their convictions would require them to register as sex offenders to local law enforcement.‖). 
32. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 20. 
33. This was the point of the various amicus briefs offered in Lawrence. See, e.g., Brief of Human 
Rights Campaign, supra note 30, at 9-10 (noting that the ―primary function‖ of sodomy laws is to 
make gay people ―criminals‖ and arguing that ―[n]o credible authority disputes that gay people have 
been subjected to the most dehumanizing forms of discrimination employed by American government 
at any level in the 20th century‖). And, of course, the American law student organization for gay, 
lesbian, transgender, and queer law students is called OutLaws. 
34. See supra note 30. 
35. Nevertheless, I should note that the amicus brief that I joined in Lawrence (written primarily 
by William Rubenstein and Pam Karlan) did cite to Justice Albie Sachs‘s opinion for the South 
African Constitutional Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of 
Justice, 1998 S.A.L.R. (Const. Ct. Oct. 9, 1998) (No. 11/98), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases 
/ZACC/1998/15.pdf. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors Bruce A. Ackerman et al., supra note 
30, at 18. Moreover, an amicus brief representing various international and human rights organizations 
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so, Choudhry‘s more general point is untouched. Using comparative 
materials to make analogies that shed light on American constitutional 
commitments might provide valuable insights in many areas, including 
gay rights cases. 
Moreover, the similarity between the outlaws arguments made in India, 
South Africa, and the United States suggests another vehicle for 
constitutional comparativism: social movements. As Choudhry notes, the 
movement for gay rights, like many other social movements, crosses 
national boundaries.36 Social movements are an important vehicle for the 
development and circulation of ideas. Because social movements are 
always interested in producing arguments that will be the most persuasive, 
they learn to tailor and reshape their arguments for each national audience. 
As a result, social movements may become effective translators and 
creators of the kinds of analogical arguments that Choudhry celebrates. 
Members of transnational social movements may transmit and translate 
particular arguments and ideas from country to country whether or not 
they explicitly cite comparative materials. 
As for rhetorical effectiveness, again I am not sure that Lawrence makes 
the best case for Choudhry‘s larger point. I am somewhat dubious that if 
O‘Connor appealed to South Africa or India‘s constitutional jurisprudence 
in her concurring opinion, her arguments would have been more 
compelling before the particular audiences she was addressing. In fact, I 
suspect that her arguments would have been less convincing to her 
intended audience and the use of comparative materials would have 
distracted attention from the merits of her argument. She would have been 
met with the same frenzy that accompanied Justice Kennedy‘s very 
modest use of comparative materials, and because she would have been 
using the analogies far more substantively than Kennedy did, the reaction 
might have been even fiercer. 
Viewed as advice about effective rhetoric, therefore, Choudhry‘s 
suggestions for Justice O‘Connor would probably have not been very 
effective in 2003 and might even have been counter-productive. Whether 
comparative analogies might be effective more today than in the future, of 
course, is another question. It has to do with how constitutional culture 
changes. And constitutional culture probably won‘t change in a way that 
makes these arguments effective, one suspects, until a critical mass of 
judges, lawyers, and scholars are willing routinely to use comparative 
 
(and substantially drafted by Yale Law School faculty, alumni, and students) emphasized that other 
countries and international courts had banned discrimination against homosexuality, offering 
numerous examples from around the world. See Brief of Mary Robinson et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 18-29, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151 (arguing that 
international and foreign court decisions had banned sexual orientation discrimination or held that 
sodomy laws were expressions of animus and irrational prejudice). 
36. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 12 (describing ―a global legal-political strategy to advance the 
cause of same-sex rights through public interest litigation‖). 
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materials in constitutional arguments. That is the sense in which the use of 
comparative materials is really a question about the evolution of culture 
and cultural practices. The best way to ensure that comparative materials 
are used in ordinary legal discourse is for lawyers to begin using them. 
That, of course, is precisely what opponents of these materials wish to 
forestall. 
II. PURPOSIVISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 
Comparativism has two moments, one that emphasizes similarity and 
one that emphasizes difference. Choudhry‘s essay emphasizes the 
possibility of similarity, or at least potential connection, between different 
constitutional cultures. Scheppele‘s essay, by contrast, emphasizes 
differences between American constitutional culture and that of other 
countries.37 Her central claim is that American constitutional culture is 
distinctive because it features originalism rather than purposivism.38 Thus, 
her argument becomes a sort of backhanded version of American 
exceptionalism. Americans are exceptional because they are parochial, out 
of step with the rest of the world. 
I agree with Scheppele that American-style originalism is almost 
unheard of outside of the United States. Ironically, it is not even the 
dominant form of argument among American judges, who are much more 
likely to make arguments from precedent. Only in rare cases of first 
impression of a constitutional text do judges primarily use originalist 
methods. That is what made the Second Amendment decisions in District 
of Columbia v. Heller39 and McDonald v. City of Chicago40 so unusual; 
there was very little Supreme Court case law on the Second Amendment, 
and nothing important since the 1930s.41 In most other contexts, precedent 
dominates, even if originalist arguments are occasionally thrown in as 
spice or decoration.42 As Sara Solow and Barry Friedman explain in their 
contribution to this Symposium, originalism is much more the province of 
popular culture and the legal academy than of everyday litigators.43 
In fact, if we look beyond surface appearances, we will discover that 
Scheppele‘s purposivism is actually characteristic of American 
constitutional culture. So I shall emphasize underlying similarities where 
 
37. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 23-24. 
38. Id. 
39. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
40. 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010). 
41. See Michael Greve, The Originalism That Was, and the One That Will Be, 25 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 101, 104 (2013) (observing that cases like Heller and McDonald are rare); Sara Aronchick 
Solow & Barry Friedman, How To Talk About the Constitution, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69 (2013). 
42. See, e.g., Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Although Justice Scalia‘s majority 
opinion offers plenty of originalist discussion, see Printz, 521 U.S. 905-15, 918-22, it ultimately turns 
on a recent precedent, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-33. 
43. Solow & Friedman, supra note 41, at 69. 
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she emphasizes differences. Indeed, her essay is valuable because it 
reveals deep aspects of constitutional culture—including American 
constitutional culture—that many observers may overlook. Moreover, 
although she attempts to use my work as a foil, her account of purposivism 
is actually consistent with the constitutional theory offered in Living 
Originalism and Constitutional Redemption. Much of Scheppele‘s 
argument seems consonant with the two books‘ focus on narrative 
construction in American constitutional culture and the idea of 
constitutional redemption. In fact, Scheppele‘s analysis helps show 
another way that the arguments of Living Originalism and Constitutional 
Redemption might apply to other constitutional cultures. 
In most ―advanced constitutional systems,‖ Scheppele explains, 
―purposive interpretation‖ dominates, which, she hastens to point out, ―is 
not originalism by another name.‖44 Scheppele identifies several features 
of purposive interpretation. First, it focuses on ―the point of a particular 
constitutional order.‖45 Second, its goal is to ―work out what the 
constitution demands of us now.‖46 Third, it ―look[s] forward to the 
imagined future of a polity rather than backward to its historical starting 
point.‖47 Instead of requiring us to live up to ―what others imagined for 
us,‖ it attempts to ―explain[] the present by understanding it in light of a 
desirable future state of affairs.‖48 
Judges engaged in purposive interpretation do not ask about the 
psychological states of drafters or adopters. Instead they ask about the 
larger purposes behind a constitution. This approach is not really foreign 
to the American tradition of constitutional interpretation. To begin with, it 
sounds remarkably similar to the interpretive practices of lawyers at the 
time of the founding. As H. Jefferson Powell pointed out in a famous 
essay, founding-era lawyers were not interested in the subjective 
intentions of the authors. Instead, they looked to the ―intent‖ of the text or 
the statute—the point and purpose of the statute given the text.49 
In fact, Scheppele‘s account of purposivism reminds me of nothing so 
much as the interpretive practices of the great Chief Justice John Marshall. 
Like other lawyers of his time, Marshall was not particularly interested in 
the psychological states of the framing generation. Instead, he ascribed 
purposes to the text based on his understanding of how the constitutional 
system was supposed to operate and, equally important, how it should 
 




48. Id. at 25. 
49. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 895 (1985) (―The ‗intent‘ of the maker of a legal document and the ‗intent‘ of the document itself 
were one and the same.‖); see also id. at 888 (―The original intentionalism was in fact a form of 
structural interpretation.‖). 
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operate in the future given its larger purposes. 
McCulloch v. Maryland50 demonstrates Marshall‘s view that the terms 
of the Constitution should be viewed together as a whole, rather than as a 
set of isolated clauses. Marshall also treated constitutional argument as 
forward-looking; this is the basis of his famous argument that the scope of 
federal power should be interpreted generously because of America‘s 
potential for growth across the continent.51 Perhaps some of the framing 
generation would have agreed with Marshall‘s vision of a continental 
republic. But many others, fearful of the sort of imperial ambitions and 
corruption they identified with Great Britain, would have rejected 
Marshall‘s remarkable anticipation of what would later be called Manifest 
Destiny.52 
Finally, two of Marshall‘s most famous statements about the 
Constitution are entirely in the spirit of Scheppele‘s account of 
purposivism. The first is that the Constitution must be construed in a way 
that adapts the plan of government to changing times, and it must always 
be interpreted in light of future needs.53 The second is that a constitution 
offers only the great outlines of a charter of government, and therefore 
must be construed generously given its central point and basic purposes.54 
Or, as Marshall famously put it, we must never forget that it is a 
constitution that we are expounding.55 Any approach that counts John 
Marshall as one of its chief exemplars can hardly be an outlier in 
American legal culture. 
Many modern constitutional scholars treat Marshall‘s synoptic, 
synthetic, and structural approach to constitutional interpretation as their 
model. Michael Greve points out that a narrow clause-bound interpretation 
is ―a product of modern-day originalism, not of an ‗exceptional‘ American 
constitutional tradition.‖56 Akhil Amar‘s work is deeply structural, always 
attempting to find connections between different parts of the text and 
different parts of the Constitution.57 And Neil Siegel has insightfully 
pointed out that the ―new textualism‖ that Jeffrey Rosen discusses is really 
 
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
51. Id. at 408 (―Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are to be marched and 
supported. The exigencies of the nation may require, that the treasure raised in the north should be 
transported to the south, that raised in the east, conveyed to the west, or that this order should be 
reversed.‖). 
52. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 963, 987-88 (1998) (contrasting Marshall‘s nationalist vision with a Jeffersonian vision of 
America as ―a tranquil land of agrarian farmers who hoped to avoid the corruptions of ambition and 
avarice characteristic of European monarchies‖). 
53. Id. at 415-16. 
54. Id. at 407-08. 
55. Id. at 407. 
56. Greve, supra note 41, at 104. 
57. See AMAR, supra note 15; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
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―the old Marshallianism.‖58 
Scheppele also explains that purposive constitutional interpretation may 
have a negative as well as a positive aspect. It may focus on what the 
constitution attempted to avoid in the light of history. In addition to 
aspiration for a better future, constitutional interpreters are often guided by 
their understanding of the reasons for drafting a constitution, and the evils, 
crises, and disappointments that led to the formation of a new political 
order. This is a central idea in Constitutional Redemption, which 
emphasizes the role of narrative construction in framing constitutional 
arguments—stories about what we promised ourselves we would do and 
stories about what we promised ourselves we would never do again.59 
Thus, in Chapter Two of Constitutional Redemption, the formation of 
the American Republic is told both as a story about aspirations toward 
freedom and republicanism and as a story about Americans distancing 
themselves from the hierarchy and corruptions of monarchy.60 The point 
can be generalized to many other examples of American constitutional 
development. Reconstruction can be understood both as a story about what 
Lincoln called a ―new birth of freedom,‖ and a story about ending the 
caste-like structures and corruption of the slaveocracy. The New Deal was 
a constitutional response to a misguided form of laissez-faire capitalism; 
the civil rights revolution dismantled the legacy of Jim Crow, and so on. 
Perhaps equally important, Scheppele explains that a narrative 
understanding of what the Constitution is designed to avoid need not be 
identical to the understandings of the founding generation, even if people 
routinely ascribe these purposes to the Founders. Although purposive 
argument may be historically informed argument, it is not an inquiry into 
the psychology of the adopting generation. Instead, interpreters in the 
future will understand the point of the constitution in light of its 
subsequent development, and in light of what later history reveals to us 
about the events that led up to the creation of the constitution (or 
amendments thereto).61 As a result, a later generation may ascribe 
purposes to the Constitution—both what the Constitution aspires to and 
what it seeks to avoid—that the adopting generation may not have actually 
held. 
Scheppele‘s central example is the German Basic Law. She points out 
that that it is widely accepted nowadays that the German Basic Law was 
designed to protect human dignity as its central value, and that the 
 
58. Neil S. Siegel, The New Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights: A 
Reply to Jeffrey Rosen, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 55, 56 (2013). 
59. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that underlying 
constitutional interpretations are narratives about ―things ‗we‘ (the People) did before, things we still 
have to do, things that we learned from past experience, things that we will never let happen again‖). 
60. Id. at 17-33. 
61. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 23-25. 
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centrality of human dignity was a reaction to ―the signature evils of 
National Socialism, in particular the Holocaust.‖62 Yet, Scheppele argues, 
―this ‗never again‘ purpose became the dominant point of the constitution 
only after the initial drafting of the Basic Law,‖ and ―was then projected 
backwards into the history of the text as its core purpose.‖63 The 
Holocaust, Scheppele points out, was not on the minds of the Basic Law‘s 
framers, who were more concerned with the division and demoralization 
of the German state following World War II, and with constitutional 
questions of federalism, the separation of powers, and religious freedom.64 
Only years later did the Holocaust ―emerg[e] as the defining evil of World 
War II,‖ transforming the public understanding of the ―moral core‖ of the 
German Basic Law in the process.65 ―With recognition that the targeted 
destruction of peoples . . . was the central evil committed by the German 
state, the point of German Basic Law shifted its center of gravity, and 
constitutional interpretation followed.‖66 
Scheppele offers Germany as a contrast to the United States, but the 
phenomenon she describes is actually fairly common in American 
constitutional culture. That is because we can understand her example in 
two ways. It is an example of an invented tradition67 in constitutional 
culture and it is an example of a structural account of the purposes of a 
constitution that is not tied to framers‘ intentions. Both types of argument 
appear prominently in American constitutional culture. 
An invented tradition is a set of norms and purposes that have 
developed comparatively recently but that are projected back onto the past 
as either having always been the case or as having existed at some 
primordial moment.68 American constitutional argument is full of such 
invented traditions, and American originalists are often some of the worst 
offenders.69 
A particularly powerful example of how Americans have reinterpreted 
the central point of their constitution is the familiar idea that the basic 
purpose of the American Constitution is to promote democracy. In fact, 
many of the Framers of the Constitution were suspicious if not opposed to 
the idea of democracy, which they thought extremely dangerous and likely 
 
62. Id. at 29. 
63. Id. at 30. 
64. Id. at 31-33. 
65. Id. at 34. 
66. Id. at 34-35. 
67. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 1–2 
(Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983). 
68. Id. at 2. 
69. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1312 (2012) (arguing that ―the notion that the concept of sex discrimination was 
traditionally understood to refer—always and only—to practices that divide men and women into two 
groups perfectly differentiated along biological sex lines‖ is an invented tradition from the mid-1970s 
that has been used to justify current doctrine). 
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to degenerate into demagoguery, dictatorship, and tyranny.70 Many of the 
Framers believed in a republic led by the ―best men,‖ whom the common 
people would look up to and follow.71 Only in the nineteenth century, and 
especially with the Jacksonian revolution, the elimination of property 
qualifications for voting, the movement for universal male suffrage, and 
the creation of mass political parties, does American politics begin to 
move toward what we would now call democracy. Our modern conception 
of the Constitution as a charter of democracy also owes a great deal to the 
Progressive Era—with its focus on good government and popular 
control—and the New Deal. The New Deal revolution emphasized judicial 
restraint; it treated the judicial exertions of the Lochner era that preceded 
the New Deal as a negative precedent that must never be repeated. This 
―never-again‖ idea helped shape the familiar notion that judicial review 
presents what Alexander Bickel called the ―counter-majoritarian 
difficulty,‖ a term coined not at the founding, but in 1962.72 
We can also understand Scheppele‘s account of the German Basic Law 
as a non-originalist structural argument. Structural arguments are 
arguments about the point of a constitution, not arguments about original 
intentions.73 To be sure, many people confuse structural argument with 
arguments from history or original intention, probably because structural 
arguments often quote historical source material like The Federalist, 
Madison‘s notes of the Philadelphia Convention, or the ratification 
debates. But even when it uses history, structural argument is not the same 
thing as historical or originalist argument. 
Structural arguments are arguments about how the Constitution works 
or should work. They are also arguments about how different parts of the 
Constitution should work together, and thus play their appropriate role in a 
larger scheme. Structural arguments are arguments about the Constitution 
as a system of government, and therefore could also be called systemic 
 
70. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO 
MADE IT 4 (1948) (describing complaints about democracy by delegates to the Philadelphia 
Convention, including Edmund Randolph, Elbridge Gerry, Roger Sherman, and William Livingston); 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 165-67 (1972) 
(noting that concerns about the excesses of democracy in state governments led to calls for a new 
constitutional convention); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its 
Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1791-92 (2010) (―[T]he Framers of the American 
Constitution believed that democracies were dangerous precisely because they might lead to what they 
called ‗tyranny‘ . . . Even as they celebrated republicanism—rule by the people—they distrusted the 
passions of majorities.‖). 
71. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 253-55 (1991) 
(explaining that Framers thought that officers of new federal government would be ―disinterested 
gentlemen‖ or ―wise and virtuous elite‖). On the phenomenon of ―deference politics,‖ both in England 
and America, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 169-79, 248-49, 285-87, 305-06 (1988). 
72. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
73. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 142, 262-63. 
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arguments.74 
Moreover, as I argue in Living Originalism, because the Constitution is 
always changing, the best structural account of the Constitution can 
change over time in ways that the adopters might not have expected or 
might even have opposed.75 As noted above, a central purpose of the 
American Constitution has become democracy; and many of its features 
have become increasingly nationalist. Many of the 1787 framers would 
have objected to both of these developments. 
Structural arguments generally invoke what Scheppele would call the 
point or purpose of a constitution; they need not be connected to original 
intentions.76 Earlier I noted that Scheppele‘s account of purposivism 
sounds a lot like John Marshall‘s approach. The reason is that Marshall, 
and many of those who followed his methods, were actually not 
originalists in the sense that Scheppele objects to. Rather, they were 
textualists and structuralists. 
In Scheppele‘s account of originalism (not mine), ―we are bound to 
become what our imagined constitutional ancestors wanted,‖77 and we 
must engage in ―a tour through the minds of those who wrote the 
constitution or who lived in those times.‖78 I do not recognize my book in 
her description of originalism; her account of purposivism seems closer to 
my argument.79 
 
74. Structural arguments are the opposite of what John Hart Ely once called a ―clause-bound 
interpretivism.‖ JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). Ely‘s key insight was that constitutional theory should go beyond a rigid dichotomy between 
―clause-bound‖ textualism and a non-interpretivism that looks for values outside of the text. Id. at 11, 
12-13, 88 & n.*. Structural arguments—like Ely‘s argument for democratic representation-
reinforcement—refer to norms that may not be overtly stated in the text. Nevertheless, these norms 
make sense of the text and express its point or purpose. See id. at 88-89, 100-01 (arguing that the point 
of the Constitution is to promote fair processes, including fair processes of representative 
government). Moreover, structural reasoning shows how different parts of the text fit together in a 
satisfying and coherent whole, and therefore should be interpreted in light of general structural 
principles. Living Originalism agrees with this basic insight of Ely‘s about the relationship between 
text and structure; it emphasizes that there are many other structural values in the Constitution besides 
Ely‘s central example of representation-reinforcement. 
75. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 261 (―Indeed, because of the cumulative 
effects of later developments, some principles that the founding generation would have rejected or 
conceived narrowly can be underlying principles today.‖). Scheppele therefore misunderstands me 
when she insists that my ―originalism presumes that the basic point of a constitutional order cannot 
shift over time‖ and that I would be ―shocked—shocked!‖—to discover that this had occurred in the 
United States. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 41. 
76. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 142 (―Structural principles do not have to 
have been intended by anyone in particular; indeed, they may only become apparent over time as we 
watch how the various elements of the constitutional system interact with each other.‖); id. at 262 
(―[S]tructural principles might emerge from the constitutional system that no single person or 
generation intended. . . . We must look to other generations as well as the founding generation to 
understand how constitutional structures should work (and how they might fail to work).‖). 
77. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 25. 
78. Id. at 29. 
79. Living Originalism argues that we should follow clear rules in the text because these rules 
were designed by the framers and adopters of a Constitution to limit discretion and to structure 
political action. Conversely, where the text provides for standards or principles instead of hard-wired 
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Scheppele believes that purposivism offers a distinctive approach to 
how history matters in constitutional argument. Purposive interpretation, 
she explains, does not require that we accept the founding generation‘s 
understanding of history or its account of a constitution‘s purposes. ―[T]he 
point of the history giving rise to the need for a new constitution can 
change over time as that history is seen in a new light,‖80 because ―it is 
precisely what happens later that allows us to understand what was 
happening at the start.‖81 Hence, Scheppele concludes, ―a vibrant 
constitutional order remakes itself over time as it comes to understand its 
own past in new ways.‖82 She could find similar sentiments in Living 
Originalism: 
Fidelity to the past is a present-day decision about what we are 
committed to seen through the lens of a present-day 
perspective. . . . [Because] the present is always changing into the 
future, . . . so too does our situation and our perspective. These are 
the inextricable circumstances of fidelity to an ongoing creedal 
tradition and a continuing political practice. 
 Even if the facts of history do not change, and even if we uncover 
no new historical sources, what history means to us and the way it 
appears to us continually do change, because we ourselves are 
moving through history and continually see what happened in the 
past through new perspectives. . . . We inevitably recognize and 
conceptualize what happened in the past from the standpoint of our 
own cultural memories and experiences. These are always 
changing— new things happen to us or become salient to us, while 
older events and memories are reinterpreted or forgotten. Hence, 
elements of the past always look salient to us in ever-new ways, 
even if specific source materials do not change. 
 History seems freshly (and differently) relevant as time passes, not 
because the facts of history have altered, but because what facts are 
important to us and what they mean to us change as we and our 
 
rules, there is room for constitutional construction reflecting contemporary understandings and values. 
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 24. Scheppele argues that this means that I am 
committed to ―focusing on the meaningful actions of a particular set of people‖—that is, the framers 
who drafted the rules—and that, therefore, my approach to constitutional interpretation is not 
purposivist. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 28 n.14. The conclusion does not follow; it confuses a specific 
argument for following hard-wired rules with a general commitment to a philosophy of original 
intention. 
 Many constitutions around the world have hard-wired rules that establish basic structures: election 
rules, the organization of the parliament, the length of terms or qualifications for officeholding, and so 
on. Like the rules in the American Constitution, these rules were also put in place to limit discretion 
and to structure politics, and it would hardly be surprising if constitutional courts enforced these norms 
as rules. But this fact, in and of itself, does not mean that interpreters who follow and enforce these 
rules cannot be purposivists. Rather, a purposivist might point out that the fact that a norm is written 
as a hard-wired rule that is difficult to evade suggests a constitutional purpose to limit discretion. 
80.  Scheppele, supra note 3, at 29. 
81. Id. at 42. 
82. Id. 
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country go through various crises, conflicts, controversies, and 
transformations. We see the problems and the difficulties, the fears 
and the commitments, the goals and the aspirations of people in the 
past in terms of our present controversies and experiences. So the 
past always seems relevant to us, in ways that may differ markedly 
from how previous generations apprehended our common history. 
History always looks new to us because we ourselves are 
constantly changing; our perspectives are constantly shifting under 
our feet. We are always moving through history and viewing the 
past from ever-new perspectives, in light of contemporaneous 
events that are themselves ever receding before us. You cannot 
step into the same Constitution twice, but this is not because the 
Constitution is always changing; it is because you and the position 
from which you interpret the Constitution are always changing.83 
The more Scheppele describes purposivism, the more I am convinced 
that it has deep resonances with the claims made in Living Originalism 
and Constitutional Redemption. One of the reasons why I find her account 
of purposivism so interesting is that it seems like an argument for what I 
call redemptive constitutionalism. If that is so, then this kind of approach 
occurs around the world, and not merely in the United States. 
A redemptive constitutionalism argues that a constitution is a 
transgenerational project in which each generation aspires to do better than 
the generations that preceded it. Each generation seeks to fulfill 
promises—not specific commands from the past—that Americans have 
made to themselves as a people, understood from the point of the present, 
not the past. Moreover, in a redemptive constitutionalism the nature of the 
future is not—and cannot be—fully contained in the past.84 What 
redemption looks like cannot be understood at the beginning of the 
process—it can only become clear over time through political contestation 
and political development.85 In addition, we understand redemption 
through narrative construction: we tell a story about ourselves that begins 
in the past and projects outward into the future. Thus, what Scheppele says 
of purposive interpretation is also true of a redemptive constitutionalism: 
―we remember the past, but we are accountable to a future and to each 
other.‖86 
In Living Originalism and Constitutional Redemption, I focus on 
American examples of redemptive constitutionalism, largely because I 
know these examples best. In both books, I try not to suggest that 
 
83. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 268-69. 
84. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 6. 
85. Id.; see also Jack M. Balkin & David Strauss, Response and Colloquy, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 
1286 (2012) (―Redemption is not making things conform to a preexisting template . . . the first 
redemption is incomplete, it‘s compromised, it‘s impure, it‘s not innocent. But it makes possible 
another redemption, and that redemption, in turn, makes possible yet another redemption.‖). 
86. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 26. 
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redemptive constitutionalism would look the same in every country. That 
is because constitutions play different roles in the political culture of 
different countries. As in the United States, people in different cultures 
make aspirational appeals that connect the past to the future; they offer 
narratives about their country‘s history; and they speak about the need to 
affirm and realize their nation‘s most basic values. But people may not 
invoke their country‘s constitution when they do this, or invoke it in the 
same way that Americans might. 
Moreover, what it means to ―redeem‖ the constitution might look very 
different in different constitutional cultures. Many Americans regard the 
Second Amendment‘s guarantee of a right to keep and bear arms as a 
crucial element of human liberty; they believe that it is perpetually 
threatened by government power and needs increased constitutional 
protection. Europeans might well recoil at such a vision of constitutional 
redemption. 
Some constitutional traditions—for example, in South Africa and 
Europe—might see constitutional redemption as the eventual acceptance 
of universal human rights and other liberal values connected to the 
Enlightenment tradition. A strongly nationalist constitutional tradition, 
however, might view redemption as the fulfillment of the nation's 
distinctive values. These values might include protecting the interests or 
the hegemony of a particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious group. 
Redeeming these distinctive constitutional values might be orthogonal to 
or even in conflict with the protection of universal human rights. Finally, 
the constitutional tradition of a theocratic country might view 
constitutional redemption as the extirpation of Western influences and the 
restoration of religious orthodoxy. 
I make these suggestions not to emphasize American distinctiveness, 
but rather out of intellectual caution. My point is simply that redemptive 
constitutionalism need not work the same way in other constitutional 
cultures as it does in the United States, because the degree of veneration 
that Americans have toward their Constitution and their Founders is 
unusual, and because different nations may have very different political 
ideals. 
Although Scheppele emphasizes American difference, I believe that she 
actually shows us deep similarities between American constitutionalism 
and other forms. Scheppele‘s account of purposivism is valuable precisely 
because she demonstrates how other countries might engage in what I call 
redemptive constitutional argument. And she shows that redemptive 
argument does not require American-style constitutional veneration or 
founder worship. 
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III. THE NEW TEXTUALISM: CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY OR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH? 
The exchange between Jeffrey Rosen87 and Neil Siegel88 concerns the 
potential strategic and political uses of what Rosen calls the ―new 
textualism.‖89 The term ―new textualism‖ was coined by Jim Ryan and 
Doug Kendall, who offer my work and Akhil Amar‘s as prominent 
examples.90 As Neil Siegel points out, the term ―new textualism‖ is a bit of 
a misnomer, because it is about structure and history as much as text, and 
it is hardly new.91 Both Amar and I see ourselves as continuing a tradition 
of synoptic (or what Scheppele would call ―purposive‖) constitutional 
interpretation employed by judges like Chief Justice Marshall, the first 
Justice Harlan, and Justice Black. Rosen also helpfully suggests Justice 
Brandeis as a predecessor of the method of text and principle.92 
Rosen believes that the new textualism ―seeks to beat conservatives at 
their own game‖ by embracing text, history, and structure. It also 
―expand[s] the range of arguments that [liberals] can use to persuade 
conservative Justices to embrace liberal results.‖93 Thus, Rosen describes 
the new textualism largely in strategic terms. Even so, Rosen believes, 
these strategic advantages are not enough: ―Ultimately . . . the success of 
the New Textualism will depend on the ability of liberals to stop 
squabbling about constitutional methodology and to agree on the 
substantive values that they belie[ve] the Constitution protects.‖94 The new 
textualism as a methodology, Rosen explains, is no substitute for a 
political vision of the Constitution or a substantive conception of justice. 
Even so, as a methodology, the new textualism might help a political 
mobilization succeed, perhaps as originalism helped conservatives succeed 
in the past forty years.95 
This is not how I understand my purposes. As I explained in 
Constitutional Redemption, I did not become an originalist ―in order to 
hoist conservatives by their own petards, or to engage in a shallow ‗me-
tooism.‘‖96 Quite the contrary, I became an originalist because I saw 
something deeply true in the appeal to text, history and structure, 
 
87. Jeffrey Rosen, How New Is the New Textualism?, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 43 (2013). 
88. Siegel, supra note 58. 
89. Rosen, supra note 87, at 44. 
90. James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1523 (2011); Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, The Case for New Textualism 21 DEMOCRACY: J. 
IDEAS 66 (2011), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/the-case-for-new-textualism.php 
?page=all. 
91. Siegel, supra note 58, at 56. 
92. Rosen, supra note 87, at 45, 50-51 (describing Brandeis‘ textualism). 
93. Id. at 44. 
94. Id. 
95. Greve, supra note 41, at 107-08. 
96. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 232. 
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something that liberals of a previous generation had forgotten.97 My 
originalism is based on a protestant constitutionalism, in which the text 
belongs to everyone and everyone may call upon it, ―in which the text 
provides a common framework for constitutional construction that offers 
the possibility of constitutional redemption.‖98 My version of originalism 
is ―much more than a theory of stasis. It is also a theory of change, often 
quite radical in nature. It is not a device for preserving the status quo. It is 
a weapon of dissent. It does not pledge faith in the dead hand of the past. It 
pledges faith in the future redemption of the Constitution.‖99 In short, what 
Rosen views as a question of political strategy, I see as a question of 
constitutional faith. The point of the new textualism is not to devise better 
political messaging or to play verbal games with one‘s political opponents. 
It is to place oneself on the side of the Constitution and to work for its 
redemption in history. 
Rosen comes closest to this idea, I think, when he mentions that in the 
past, progressives were successful at ―claiming the Constitution as their 
own.‖ and ―making political arguments in constitutional terms.‖100 He also 
notes that Akhil Amar‘s textualism is based on the view that the 
Constitution, rightly understood, is a progressive document that has 
evolved toward increasing inclusiveness and equality.101 
Consider these three ideas together: (1) claiming the Constitution as 
your own, (2) being unafraid to state your arguments in terms of the 
Constitution itself rather than merely in terms of good public policy, and 
(3) affirming that however unjust, imperfect, and fallen the Constitution-
in-practice might be, the arc of the Constitution bends toward justice. 
These are not simply strategems or feints. They are matters of political 
belief. 
The new textualism—or at least my version of it—reflects an 
attachment to the Constitution and a faith in the Constitution. Our 
attachment to the Constitution means that we view it not only as basic law 
and higher law but also as ―our law‖—a law that is the product of our 
collective strivings and ambitions, a law that belongs to all Americans and 
that we have every right to call upon. 
The new textualism also presumes a faith in the constitutional 
framework. Rosen understands that the next generation of liberals need 
more than methodology; they must also have a substantive constitutional 
vision that is worth fighting for. I would say that they need even more than 





100. Rosen, supra note 87, at 53. 
101. Id. at 47. 
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Constitution is theirs, and that they have the authority to declare what it 
means every bit as much as their political opponents, who are, after all, 
their fellow Americans. To have faith in the Constitution, they must 
believe that the Constitution contains the resources for its own 
redemption, and commit themselves to working for that redemption—not 
just in some future time, but today. 
IV. A PLEA FOR ORDINARY PRACTICE 
Sara Solow and Barry Friedman‘s article102 disagrees with Rosen about 
the potential value of interpretive theory. Theirs is a plea to abandon 
sterile debates about methodology and to return to the everyday practice of 
constitutional interpretation, using the familiar modalities of constitutional 
argument—text, history, structure, precedent, consequences, and ethos. 
Solow and Friedman ―urge a turn away from the longstanding debates 
over interpretive methodology and toward more actual interpretation,‖ 
using methods common to most lawyers and judges.103 
Solow and Friedman believe that academic debates about constitutional 
interpretation are full of jargon that cannot speak to ordinary citizens. In 
particular, they assert that my book ―fails to offer a digestible organizing 
principle or message to those members of the public who might seek to 
use it as a platform for constitutional dialogue.‖104 What Solow and 
Friedman want instead is ―a slogan for recapturing the constitutional high 
ground.‖105 
Solow and Friedman remind me of the Talmudic story in which the 
great Rabbis Shammai and Hillel are confronted by a pagan who says that 
he will convert to Judaism if either rabbi can explain the entire Torah to 
him while standing on one foot.106 Shammai, who apparently believes 
either that the man is taunting him or that the Torah is too complicated to 
summarize, chases him off. Hillel, by contrast, calmly takes up the 
challenge. ―What is hateful to you,‖ he explains, ―do not do to your 
neighbor. The rest is commentary. Now go and study.‖107 
Solow and Friedman believe that we academics are destined to be like 
Shammai. But I think we can also model ourselves after Hillel. And so I 
say to them: if you want a slogan, I can give you a slogan. If you want me 
to explain how to interpret the Constitution standing on one foot, I will 
stand on one foot. Everything I say in Living Originalism can be boiled 
 
102. Solow & Friedman, supra note 41. 
103. Id. at 69. 
104. Id. at 74. 
105. Id. 
106. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 31a. The questioner is one of three gentiles seeking 
conversion and making unreasonable demands; each gentile is rebuffed by Shammai and patiently 
accepted by Hillel. 
107. Id. 
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down to a few sentences: ―The Constitution is yours. Be faithful to its text 
and to its great principles. The rest is commentary. Now go and study.‖ 
Indeed, not to put too fine a point on it, that is why my method of 
interpretation is called ―text and principle.‖ 
Although I am happy to engage in slogans or even jingles if need be, I 
think that Solow and Friedman—discouraged by the aridity of much 
academic debate—have given up too easily on constitutional theory. After 
all, there is far more to constitutional theory than debates about how to 
interpret the Constitution. And I have always believed that interpretive 
debates must ultimately be grounded in much larger questions about the 
sources of constitutional legitimacy and the mechanisms of legitimate 
constitutional change. 
In fact, the most important parts of Living Originalism and 
Constitutional Redemption are not arguments about the proper methods of 
constitutional interpretation. Rather, in my view, the point of these books 
is to show: (1) the sources of constitutional development; (2) how change 
is the only constant in the life of a stable constitution; (3) how legitimacy 
is produced not at a magic moment but continuously and over time; (4) the 
purposes of a constitution and constitutional language; (5) the role of 
citizens, social movements, political parties, and the political branches in 
constitutional change; (6) why the institutions and processes of 
constitutional change help further democratic legitimacy in the long run; 
(7) how people of different substantive views participate in the production 
of constitutional change; (8) the importance of viewing the Constitution as 
a document of redemption; (9) the centrality of narrative in constructing 
constitutional vision; and (10) the role of constitutional faith in producing 
constitutional legitimacy over time. These are questions of constitutional 
theory that go well beyond arguments about which version of original-
meaning originalism is the only true and correct one. 
Some of the concerns of my book may primarily interest academics, but 
others—those of narrative, faith, and redemption—go to the very heart of 
political life. Ordinary citizens care about the latter concerns as much as 
academics do. For me, at least, questions of interpretive theory cannot be 
addressed in isolation; they must flow from these larger questions of 
legitimacy and faith, and not the other way around. Indeed, I would go 
further: anyone who reads Living Originalism as centrally about the 
correct methods of interpretation rather than these questions has not 
understood the book. 
A focus on ordinary practice is opposed, on the one hand, to academic 
debates about theory and, on the other hand, to debates about 
constitutional vision of the sort that Jeffrey Rosen describes. Arguments 
about constitutional vision are also implicit in Michael Greve‘s call for a 
new kind of originalism that focuses on the Constitution‘s larger purpose 
of creating structures of competitive federalism. I assume that both Rosen 
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and Greve would agree with me that just as methodology is insufficient 
without a constitutional vision, so too is a call for ordinary practice. 
Solow and Friedman believe that standard methods can yield surprising 
results. ―[W]e advocate adopting [the] common and familiar method [of] 
‗ordinary constitutional interpretation,‘‖ to ―show how . . . one can come 
to important and perhaps surprising conclusions about what is part of our 
Constitution (and what is not).‖108 Surely one can use the familiar forms of 
constitutional rhetoric to argue for many different positions, but that does 
not make these positions plausible or likely to be accepted. The use of the 
modalities, by itself, cannot win over a hostile audience or move 
arguments from ―off the wall‖ to ―on the wall.‖ That task must be 
accomplished through other features of the constitutional system. 
Solow and Friedman‘s call for a return to ordinary practice tells us 
nothing about constitutional vision, and nothing about the connections 
between practices of interpretation and legitimacy. Let me say a bit about 
each. 
Solow and Friedman‘s argument for a right to education is a tour de 
force of constitutional modalities. But it is unlikely to persuade anyone 
unless it resonates with that person‘s constitutional vision. One doubts that 
many contemporary conservatives will change their minds in the face of 
Solow and Friedman‘s virtuoso performance. Rather, as Friedman the 
constitutional historian would point out, these arguments will become 
compelling when they are broadly supported by public opinion. Or, as I 
would point out, they are likely to prevail only as a result of successful 
mobilizations in politics, litigation campaigns, and new judicial 
appointments. The work that ―ordinary constitutional interpretation‖ is 
doing remains unclear when it is divorced from these larger structural 
forces. 
Solow and Friedman base their argument for ordinary practice on the 
work of Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon.109 But, unlike Solow and 
Friedman, neither Bobbitt nor Fallon believed that questions of legitimacy 
or constitutional theory were irrelevant to their project. To the contrary, 
each sought to show that their theories of interpretation either explained or 
justified the legitimacy of judicial review and the constitutional system. 
Bobbitt, influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, argues that our existing 
constitutional practice of argument is self-legitimating because it is an 
ongoing form of political life.110 We use the six modalities—and only 
 
108. Solow & Friedman, supra note 41, at 69. 
109. Id. at 76-77. 
110. BOBBITT, supra note 23, at 233-40, 244-45; PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, 122-40, 155-56 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; 
Philip C. Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1869, 1886 (1994) (―The second 
conclusion of Constitutional Fate was its rejection of an external legitimating criterion for law.‖). 
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those six—because they were handed down to us from the common law.111 
Using the standard modalities according to their traditional forms ensures 
the legitimacy both of constitutional interpretation in general and judicial 
review in particular.112 Conversely, theoretical or political attacks on the 
use of particular modalities, and ―ideologies‖ like originalism or 
prudentialism that seek to elevate some modalities over others, 
misunderstand the nature of our inherited form of life. Such attacks 
undermine the legitimacy of the system.113 
Fallon, drawing on coherentist theories of truth, argues that ―[t]he 
implicit norms of our practice of constitutional interpretation prescribe an 
effort to achieve plausible understandings of arguments from text, the 
framers‘ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and relevant values, all of 
which point to the same result.‖114 If a result is justifiable through all or 
most all of the ways that lawyers have traditionally tried to discover 
constitutional meaning, such uses of legal argument are more likely to be 
legitimate. Fallon‘s claim is simultaneously descriptive and normative. 
Interpreters in the American system both do attempt and should attempt to 
seek consensus between the forms of argument because this coherence 
legitimates the practice of constitutional argument. 
Note that Bobbitt and Fallon do not have the same theory of legitimacy. 
When the modalities conflict, Fallon argues, ―the implicit norms of our 
constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to arguments from 
text, followed, in descending order, by arguments concerning the framers‘ 
intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and moral and policy values.‖115 
For Bobbitt, on the other hand, no modality of argument dominates the 
others, and when the modalities conflict, the individual interpreter must 
 
111. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 110, at 121 (arguing that once 
sovereignty is separated from the state, ―the power of the state, no longer sovereign, was put under 
law—the Constitution—and by doing so, put under the common law forms of argument‖); Philip C. 
Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1303 (1989) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET, RED 
WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988)) (―These six forms are 
available to any judge; indeed it was their availability as common law forms that recommended them 
once the power of the state was subordinated to law by our Constitution.‖). 
112. See Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 272 (1993) 
(reviewing PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)): 
Bobbitt‘s position is that all attempts to find a normative foundation outside the conventions 
of legal argument confuse legitimacy with justification. Neither the Constitution, the 
conventions of legal argument, nor judicial review requires legitimation. Legitimacy is 
obtained when the conventions of legal argument (the modalities) are adhered to. 
Justification is the use of the modalities to demonstrate that a proposition of constitutional 
law is true. A constitutional argument in support of the truth of a proposition of constitutional 
law is legitimate to the extent it employs the modalities. To the degree it does not, it is 
illegitimate. 
113. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 110, at xii (1991) (noting that, 
during the twentieth century, people on both the left and the right undermined constitutional 
legitimacy by attacking various modalities or elevating particular modalities over others). 
114. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1240 (1987). 
115. Id. at 1193-94. 
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turn to conscience. Decision according to conscience preserves the 
legitimacy of the decision.116 Thus, for Fallon adherence to ordinary 
practice legitimates because it strives for coherence; for Bobbitt ordinary 
practice is self-legitimating as a conventional cultural form that creates a 
space for individual conscience. 
Solow and Friedman do not tell us why their approach explains or 
promotes the legitimacy of the constitutional system as a whole. It is not 
clear that they would accept Bobbitt‘s Wittgensteinian philosophy or 
Fallon‘s coherentist account. Instead, they want to stop talking about the 
legitimacy question altogether. That makes sense if (1) existing practices 
are widely accepted and largely uncontroversial, and (2) conventional 
practice is either consistent with or furthers the political legitimacy of the 
entire system. 
As to the first point, Solow and Friedman assume—correctly, I think—
that the use of multiple modalities is widely accepted among lawyers and 
judges. Nevertheless, if they did a systematic empirical study of lawyers‘ 
briefs and judicial opinions, I suspect they would find that recourse to 
judicial precedent dwarfs all of the other modalities put together.117 If that 
is so, then Solow and Friedman may actually be asking for a departure 
from existing practice, which, of course, they would have to justify. 
As to the second point, Solow and Friedman make no argument—in this 
article, at least—for why their account of conventional practice is 
consistent with or furthers the political legitimacy of the constitutional 
system as a whole. However, Friedman, wearing his hat as constitutional 
historian and theorist, does have an answer to this question. In his 2009 
book The Will of People, he explains that constitutional development is 
consistent with democratic and sociological legitimacy (although perhaps 
not moral legitimacy) because the Supreme Court tends to stick fairly 
closely to popular opinion, especially after the New Deal.118 
Of course, this explanation raises a couple of puzzles. First, given 
Friedman‘s account of why judicial review is democratically legitimate, 
what is it about the use of multiple modalities of constitutional argument 
that helps ensure this legitimacy? Does the use of these modalities in 
precisely the way that Solow and Friedman prescribe somehow drive 
constitutional doctrine to match public opinion over time, or would using a 
smaller, larger, or different set of modalities lead to pretty much the same 
results? If a different approach would work just as well, then ordinary 
practice doesn‘t seem to be doing very much work in promoting 
 
116. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 110, at 168. 
117. See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of 
Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 495 (1996) (emphasizing the dominance of doctrinal 
argument in constitutional adjudication, especially for lower court judges). 
118. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
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democratic legitimacy. Lots of different approaches might equally achieve 
a connection between judicial product and popular opinion. 
The second puzzle follows from the first. As I argue in Living 
Originalism, and consistent with Friedman‘s account in The Will of the 
People, among the most important drivers of constitutional change are 
social and political mobilizations, the party system, and the practice of 
partisan entrenchment in the federal judiciary. Over the long run these 
mechanisms keep judicial decisions roughly in line with popular opinion 
(in Friedman‘s view) or with the dominant political regime (in my 
account). 
The problem is that many of these social and political mobilizations 
tend to think that arguments about how courts should interpret (or not 
interpret) the Constitution are quite important. Social and political 
movements often attack existing practices of constitutional interpretation 
and propose new ones in their stead. For example, the idea of a living 
constitution does not arise first in the 1960s, as Solow and Friedman 
suggest;119 it begins in the 1920s and 1930s as a challenge to Lochner-era 
decisions, and it is accompanied by a call for judicial restraint and for 
making judicial practice consistent with democracy.120 The idea of a living 
constitution is transformed during the Warren Court era to justify not 
judicial restraint but the use of judicial power to promote the values of 
Kennedy/Johnson liberalism and to check outliers in state and local 
governments, especially in the South.121 Defenders of the older vision of 
living constitutionalism (exemplified by Justice Frankfurter and his 
acolytes) continued to preach the old-time religion of judicial restraint and 
denounced the practice of the federal courts and the Supreme Court as 
lawless and illegitimate.122 
 
119. Solow & Friedman, supra note 41, at 70. 
120. See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion 
of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191 
(1997). Moreover, as I show in Constitutional Redemption, Franklin Roosevelt anticipates the method 
of text and principle in the constitutional struggle over the New Deal. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 240-42. 
121. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (―[T]he Equal 
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines 
are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any 
more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to 
be the limits of fundamental rights.‖); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) (―In 
approaching this problem [of segregated public schools], we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when 
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider 
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation.‖). 
122. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 228-34 (2002) (describing academic 
arguments for judicial restraint by Justice Frankfurter‘s followers and the Legal Process scholars); 
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to 
the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144 (1964) 
(complaining about the Warren Court‘s work). 
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Similarly, movement conservatives developed originalism to critique 
the work of the Warren and early Burger Courts, arguing that the current 
practices of lawyers and judges were illegitimate. Even though most 
judges have not become originalists in their everyday decisionmaking, the 
conservative critique nevertheless reshaped constitutional culture over 
time—in public discourse, in legal practice, and in the legal academy. Like 
living constitutionalism, originalism started out as a justification for 
judicial restraint and sought to promote democratic decisionmaking.123 
Once conservatives had stocked the courts, however, a new generation of 
conservatives began to argue for what is now called ―judicial 
engagement‖—the term ―judicial activism‖ having been rendered 
radioactive by a previous generation of conservatives.124 Now movement 
conservatives argued that courts should be unafraid to flex their judicial 
muscles to protect important structural values in the Constitution, the free 
speech rights of corporations and conservative Christians, equal protection 
for white people, the rights of property owners, Second Amendment 
rights, and so on. Sometime in the 1990s, liberals began to sit up and take 
notice; they stopped pining for the second coming of Earl Warren. Instead, 
they began to denounce conservative exercises of judicial review, offering 
new theories of minimalism, departmentalism, ―taking the Constitution 
away from the courts,‖ popular constitutionalism, and democratic 
constitutionalism. And the beat goes on. 
This abbreviated history suggests two things. First, ―ordinary 
constitutional interpretation‖ is a moving target, constantly subject to 
revision, and constantly theorized and argued over, not only within the 
legal academy but in social and political movements as well. Second, and 
equally important, this history suggests that the actual practices of lawyers 
and judges have often included challenges to what was then regarded as 
―ordinary‖ constitutional interpretation. The recurrent debates about 
interpretive theory that drive Solow and Friedman to distraction may not 
be just an academic sideshow. These debates may be part of the larger 
constitutional culture, and integral to the processes of constitutional 
development. What Solow and Friedman would like to cast out from the 
purity of ordinary constitutional practice is actually part of the practice. 
Fighting over how to interpret the Constitution and who has authority to 
interpret the Constitution has been an essential ingredient in the way that 
 
123. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 599, 602 (2004) 
(―The primary commitment within this critical posture [of the old originalism] was to judicial restraint. 
Originalist methods of constitutional interpretation were understood as a means to that end.‖); Greve, 
supra note 41. 
124. Mark Tushnet, From Judicial Restraint to Judicial Engagement: A Short Intellectual 
History, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1043 (2012); Whittington, supra note 123, at 604-05 (―As 
conservatives found themselves in the majority, conservative constitutional theory—and perhaps 
originalism—needed to develop a governing philosophy appropriate to guide majority opinions, not 
just to fill dissents.‖). 
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lawyers and judges—not to mention social and political movements—
have argued about the Constitution during the twentieth century. To be 
sure, sometimes academics have been fussier—and, well, more 
academic—in their arguments than most lawyers and judges have been, 
but their debates about constitutional interpretation have not been sealed 
off from those occurring in constitutional politics. Quite the contrary: to 
vary Clausewitz‘s famous dictum, interpretation wars are a continuation of 
constitutional politics by other means. They are part and parcel of the 
processes of constitutional change. 
V. BABYSITTERS AND CITIZENS 
Michael Greve‘s essay begins from very different premises than Solow 
and Friedman‘s. Greve believes that the task of constitutional theory is to 
reveal the deep structures of the Constitution and to offer a comprehensive 
constitutional vision.125 Greve‘s vision, as outlined in his remarkable 
book, The Upside-Down Constitution, is that the Constitution produces 
political stability and economic prosperity through competitive 
federalism.126 Greve recognizes that debates about constitutional 
interpretation are often lodged in larger political and social movements 
that affect interpretive practice. Finally, his general approach to 
constitutional interpretation, like Scheppele‘s and mine, is purposive, even 
though, like me and unlike Scheppele, he is happy to be called an 
originalist. 
Readers of Greve‘s work on the ―upside-down Constitution‖ will not 
encounter a laundry list of opinions about particular clauses or a set of 
lawyerly arguments employing Solow‘s and Friedman‘s ―ordinary 
constitutional interpretation.‖ Rather, readers of Greve‘s book will 
discover a coherent synoptic vision that unifies many different parts of the 
Constitution under an overarching conception, whether or not one agrees 
with that vision. A strong constitutional vision, Jeffrey Rosen argues, must 
underwrite arguments about interpretive methodology. Greve would surely 
agree.127 In Greve‘s view, the correct path for constitutional interpretation 
today is not the ―democratic originalism‖ of the 1980s but an originalism 
motivated by Greve‘s federalist vision, in which strong judicial review 
may be a necessary tool.128 
The disagreements between Greve and myself are pitched at this basic 
 
125. Greve, supra note 41, at 104 (―‗[E]xpounding‘ a constitution . . . cannot be done without 
(among other things) some account of what the instrument is supposed to do. That account, in turn, 
requires a theory of politics . . . .‖). 
126. MICHAEL GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2011). 
127. Greve, supra note 41, at 107-11. 
128. See id. at 109-10 (arguing that ―constituencies that are worried about government overreach 
and abuse and, more broadly, the fate of the country‘s economic order‖ want ―judicial ‗engagement,‘ 
not ‗restraint‘‖). 
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level of constitutional purpose and vision, and that is why, for different 
reasons, each of us believes that the older forms of originalism developed 
by movement conservatives have run out of steam. 
Greve explains his vision by way of a famous passage in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‘s Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein‘s text reads: 
―Someone says to me: ‗Shew the children a game.‘ I teach them gaming 
with dice, and the other says, ‗I didn‘t mean that sort of game.‘ Must the 
exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave 
me the order?‖129 Greve imagines that the speaker is a parent giving 
directions to a babysitter, although Wittgenstein does not say this. 
Because living originalism does not treat original expected applications 
as binding, Greve argues, it does not sufficiently constrain a wayward 
future. Living originalism, he explains, is like a babysitter who, instructed 
to show the children a game, teaches the children ―to duel with kitchen 
knives and to shoot dice for money.‖130 In so doing, it ―slights a central 
purpose of constitutionalism—the purpose of keeping stuff off the wall 
even if you cannot exactly envision what future generations might think 
of.‖131 In fact, Greve argues, ―What living originalism says instead is, 
‗Babysitters of the world unite! Let‘s start a social movement and invent 
some more games.‘‖132 Greve‘s point is that the ―intended purpose‖ of 
originalism—and of constitutions generally—is to ―discipline[] a wayward 
politics.‖133 In particular, Greve believes that the American Constitution 
was enacted in order to discipline states so that they would compete with 
each other. The deep structural purpose of our constitution is to establish 
competitive federalism, and for that reason, Greve believes, much of our 
post-New Deal jurisprudence is mistaken. 
This is a dispute, in Scheppele‘s terms, about the point of a constitution. 
I have a different view than Greve does, and I shall use the same example 
from Wittgenstein to express it. Wittgenstein, of course, is a notoriously 
gnomic philosopher, and it is often difficult to pin down why he uses a 
story or example as he does. Although I do not pretend to be a 
Wittgenstein scholar, I think Greve has missed what Wittgenstein was 
actually interested in. 
Wittgenstein offers his imaginary dialogue in the middle of a larger 
discussion about the nature of categories and the uses of language. He is 
challenging the traditional view that in order for people to use language 
effectively, linguistic concepts must have necessary and sufficient 
conditions that can be known in advance. This is the same part of the 
 
129. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33 (1954). 
130. Greve, supra note 41, at 105. 
131. Id. at 106. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 111. 
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Philosophical Investigations in which Wittgenstein introduces his famous 
idea of ―family resemblances.‖134 He uses the meaning of the word 
―game‖ as an example of a concept that does not adhere to the classical 
conception of categories, that is not bounded by necessary and sufficient 
conditions, but whose examples bear family resemblances, and whose 
meaning is developed over time in culture and through practice. 
Wittgenstein offers his example about teaching children a game in order 
to make at least two different points. The first is that speakers of a 
language figure out the meanings of the terms they use as they go along; 
as they are confronted by new circumstances, they make analogies to 
examples already encountered. Thus, the meaning of the word ―game‖ is 
not fully determined at the time the speaker gives the order; rather, its 
meaning in context is developed through experience and through practice. 
If this is Wittgenstein‘s point, then it seems far more consistent with living 
originalism than with fidelity to original expected applications. The point 
of using abstract language like ―freedom of speech‖ or ―equal protection 
of the laws‖ is not to settle everything at the moment of adoption; rather it 
is to set in motion a learning process about our commitments, in which we 
may revise our views as we encounter new experiences. That is why, 
Wittgenstein suggests, the full meaning of ―game‖ did not have to be in 
the speaker‘s mind when he gave the order to teach the children a game.135 
Wittgenstein‘s second point is that speakers of a language do not 
consciously have to intend all of the things they mean when they use 
language. Rather, the audience properly infers this meaning from the 
social context of the situation and from existing social conventions.136 
Language is embedded in culture, in thick features of social life and in 
conventions of interpersonal interaction. These aspects of culture bestow 
meaning on our words quite apart from any conscious intentions we might 
have. Therefore, given the context—as Greve imagines it—the babysitter 
should understand what the parent says consistent with the babysitter‘s 
role: guarding and guiding children who are too young to think for 
themselves. 
But if meaning is embedded in culture in this way, then we must not 
assume that the social context that applies to parents and babysitters is the 
same as the social context that applies to different generations living under 
an enduring constitution. We must focus on how and why language is used 
 
134. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 129, §§ 66-69; see SEVERIN SCHROEDE, WITTGENSTEIN: THE 
WAY OUT OF THE FLY BOTTLE 140-45 (2006) (discussing how Wittgenstein uses the concept of 
―game‖ to introduce the idea of ―family resemblances‖). 
135. This idea—that we should elaborate constitutional meaning in new contexts in light of prior 
practice—is consistent with John Marshall‘s admonition that a constitution must ―be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs.‖ McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
136. See SCHROEDE, supra note 134, at 195-96 (arguing that meaning ―is not made by some 
miraculous mental mechanism, but by the circumstances in which the particular utterance is made‖ 
including background conventions and social institutions). 
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in a constitution. And not just any constitution, but ―a constitution, 
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to 
the various crises of human affairs.‖137 A constitution is a trans-
generational project that requires the work, the commitment, and the 
judgment of many generations to succeed. It begins as a mere framework 
that must be built out over time in order to produce a decent politics. 
Greve and I agree that the goal of a constitution is to channel politics 
and to constrain it where needed. We agree that constitutions not only can 
but must discipline politics in particular ways. For example, I argue in 
Living Originalism that the choice of hard-wired rules, standards, and 
principles in a constitution reflects a series of choices about what kinds of 
constraints to impose on later generations. In making sense of a 
constitution, we can and we should ascribe these architectural choices to 
the adopters whether or not they were specifically or consciously intended. 
Where Greve and I disagree, I think, is about the nature of 
constitutional discipline: what basic substantive commitments the 
Constitution contains, and how political discipline is achieved. Perhaps 
equally important, we disagree about the role that later generations will 
play in ensuring that important constitutional commitments are preserved. 
Greve reads Wittgenstein as talking about parents and babysitters 
because he believes that the central purpose of a Constitution is to prevent 
later generations from engaging in self-destructive, child-like behavior. 
Like children, later generations will lack impulse control; they will spend 
too much, and politicians will lack the incentives to rein them in.138 
We Americans may refer to the founding generation as ―the Founding 
Fathers,‖ but the familial metaphor is quite misleading. The Founders are 
not our parents; we are not children lacking in mental capacity; and 
judges—who are, after all, our contemporaries—are not our babysitters. 
The parent/babysitter metaphor, I fear, leads one to view later 
generations as childlike, impulsive people who cannot be trusted with their 
own political destiny. Their opinions about how to implement a 
constitution do not and should not matter except to the extent that they 
follow the wisdom of the Framers. In that case, they are not expressing 
their own reasoning but the political logic of a former, wiser time that has 
not fallen prey to the political and fiscal temptations of the present. 
That is now how I see things. The temptations of politics are ever-
present; they occur in our generation and in the generation of the framers. 
For this reason, we need a Constitution for our own time as much as the 
framers did in their time. But the work of the adopting generation is 
 
137. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415. 
138. See Greve, supra note 41, at 110 (―[T]he demos appears to insist both on a really big transfer 
state and on not paying for it, and that disposition has brought the country to the edge of a financial 
abyss.‖). 
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necessarily limited. It can only begin a constitutional project, it cannot 
complete it. It can only create a basic framework for a decent politics on 
which later generations must build. And this is necessary precisely 
because human vision is limited and human predictive judgment is 
fallible. Adopters can hope to channel political judgment through a 
combination of rules, standards, and principles, but they cannot forestall 
the exercise of that judgment. A constitution necessarily must leave much 
to later generations. 
All of this leads me to understand Greve‘s project differently than he 
does. Greve—who wants a tighter, more business-friendly fiscal 
constitution, and who wants to ensure that states compete rather than 
collude—sees himself as calling for a return to commands from the distant 
past that can constrain an unruly present. I see Greve instead as a present-
day participant in the process of building out the Constitution in a post-
New Deal world. He is a reformer using the rhetorical tropes of restoration 
for what is actually a modernist project—achieving a workable, business-
friendly fiscal constitution in the age of the administrative and welfare 
state. 
An ongoing constitutional project needs people like Greve—as well as 
those who disagree with him. It needs them not as the servants of wise 
founders but as intelligent people exercising their own present-day 
constitutional judgments that draw on the past as a resource. The 
Constitution-in-practice is a work in progress that might move in many 
different directions. Greve wants to move it in one way; I want to move it 
in another. But neither of us is simply returning to a course already fully 
prepared for us; we are urging people to move forward to what we believe 
is the right path. Each of us, although drawing on the past, is exercising 
political judgment in our own time. 
The familial/babysitter metaphor also disguises the source of democratic 
authority for a long-lived Constitution. The Constitution has democratic 
authority in part because it serves as ―our law.‖ But for it to serve as our 
law, Americans cannot view the Constitution as swaddling clothes 
designed to contain an unruly infant. Rather, each generation must have a 
stake it its continuation; each generation must see the Constitution—in 
part—as the work of its own hands. One can still honor the founding 
generation without believing that it contains all wisdom, or that the 
Founders‘ relationship to us is that between wise parents and immature 
children. For the same reason, judges do not obtain authority as babysitters 
whose job is to discipline unruly children according to the desires of their 
parents. Although constrained by legal culture and professional role, the 
judges in each generation are ultimately no better and no worse than the 
public they are part of. 
The authority of the Constitution is not parental authority. It comes from 
the participation of successive generations in the constitutional project, 
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each of which can therefore claim the Constitution as its own. The 
constitution-making power of the people is not exhausted by initial 
adoption or by intermittent amendment. Rather, it is continually exercised 
over time through constitutional construction. The Constitution is not 
merely inherited; it is also built out and adapted. It is always in a state of 
becoming and that is why it endures. Through this process of 
constitutional construction, the Constitution becomes more than a 
venerated object from the past. It becomes and continues to be ―our law.‖ 
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